The Dynamics of Power in Labor Markets: Monopolistic Unions versus Monopsonistic Employers

Samuel Dodini, Kjell G Salvanes and Alexander Willén ()

No 15635, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper brings together the modern research on employer power and employee power by empirically examining the effects of unionization on worker earnings, employment, and inequality across differently concentrated markets. Exploiting national tax reforms to union membership dues as exogenous shocks to unionization, we show that high levels of unionization mitigate the negative wage and employment effects generated by imperfect competition. We also identify considerable effect heterogeneity with respect to worker types across differentially concentrated markets, and show that this has major implications for the role of unions in shaping labor market wage inequality.

Keywords: monopsony; skills; unions; market concentration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J23 J24 J42 J51 J52 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Dynamics of Power in Labor Markets: Monopolistic Unions versus Monopsonistic Employers (2021)
Working Paper: The Dynamics of Power in Labor Markets: Monopolistic Unions versus Monopsonistic Employers (2021)
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