How to Best Fight Poverty: The Uneven Ex-post Effects of Conditional and Unconditional Cash Transfers on Labor Earnings

Ainoa Aparicio Fenoll () and Roberto Quaranta
Additional contact information
Ainoa Aparicio Fenoll: University of Turin

No 15658, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Programs to fight poverty aim at allowing individuals to support themselves ex-post, when they are not part of the program anymore. We compare the ex-post effects of conditional and unconditional cash transfer programs on labor income. We use an experiment where low-income individuals are randomly assigned to three groups: no treatment, unconditional cash transfer, and cash transfer conditional on reemployment training. We exploit Social Security data, including all registered labor contracts in Italy. Results show that conditional cash transfers have positive and sizeable effects on labor income, both contemporaneous and ex-post effects. These effects last at least two years and are led by males. Unconditional cash transfers have no impact on labor income.

Keywords: cash transfers; conditionality; poverty; social security data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I31 J21 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp15658.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15658

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().