Disability Insurance Screening and Worker Outcomes

Alexander Ahammer and Analisa Packham ()
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Analisa Packham: Vanderbilt University

No 16235, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We estimate the returns to more targeted disability insurance (DI) programs in terms of labor force participation, program spillovers, and worker health. To do so, we analyze workers after a workplace injury that experience differential levels of application screening. We find that when workers face stricter screening requirements, they are less likely to receive DI benefits and are more likely to remain in the labor force. We observe no differences in any physical or mental health outcomes. Our findings imply that imposing stricter DI screening has large fiscal benefits but does not yield any detectable health costs, on the margin.

Keywords: disability insurance; retirement; health (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 I38 J16 J18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-lab
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Related works:
Working Paper: Disability Insurance Screening and Worker Outcomes (2023)
Working Paper: Disability Insurance Screening and Worker Outcomes (2022)
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