Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision

Johannes Abeler (), David B. Huffman () and Collin Raymond ()
Additional contact information
Johannes Abeler: University of Oxford
David B. Huffman: University of Pittsburgh
Collin Raymond: Purdue University

No 16284, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Using field and laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that the complexity of incentive schemes and worker bounded rationality can affect effort provision, by shrouding attributes of the incentives. In our setting, complexity leads workers to over-provide effort relative to a fully rational benchmark, and improves efficiency. We identify contract features, and facets of worker cognitive ability, that matter for shrouding. We find that even relatively small degrees of shrouding can cause large shifts in behavior. Our results illustrate important implications of complexity for designing and regulating workplace incentive contracts.

Keywords: complexity; bounded rationality; shrouded attribute; ratchet effect; dynamic incentives; field experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 D9 J2 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 195 pages
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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