Building Reputation: Proxy Wars and Transnational Identities

Marion Mercier, Arthur Silve and Benjamin Tremblay-Auger ()
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Benjamin Tremblay-Auger: Stanford GSB

No 16340, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In the context of a global security framework that mitigates interstate conflicts, nation-states establish a reputation for resolve by supporting foreign insurrections. Our theoretical predictions indicate that states with a greater number of co-ethnic groups abroad are more inclined to endorse foreign uprisings, resulting in higher political inclusion for such groups. With a dataset comprising over 280,000 ethnic group × sponsor state × target state × year observations, our analysis corroborates the role of reputation-building through co-ethnicity narratives as a determinant of sponsor state engagement. We argue that this mechanism engenders political concessions within target states, ultimately benefiting groups associated with reputed potential sponsors.

Keywords: reputation; proxy war (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 N40 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2023-07
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