Do Financial Bonuses to Employees Reduce Their Absenteeism? Outcome of a Lottery
Wolter Hassink () and
Pierre Koning
Additional contact information
Wolter Hassink: Utrecht University
No 1644, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
This paper investigates the effectiveness of a monthly lottery in reducing sick leave among workers in a manufacturing firm. Conditions of participation are not having reported sick in the previous three months and not having won the lottery earlier. It turns out that the lottery results in a decrease in the rate of sick leave of 1.6 percentage point. From the perspective of the firm, the lottery is found to be highly beneficial – that is, the benefits associated with the decrease in the sick leave rate exceed the costs of the lottery. Workers seem to be primarily driven by the first upcoming lottery. After winning the lottery, winners resume their previous (rate of) absence.
Keywords: absenteeism; sick leave; incentives; lottery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J22 J32 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2005-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Published - published in: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 2009, 62 (3), 327 - 342
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Working Paper: Do Financial Bonuses to Employees Reduce their Absenteeism? Outcome of a Lottery (2005) 
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