Competitive Job Seekers: When Sharing Less Leaves Firms at a Loss

Gaurav Chiplunkar (), Erin Kelley () and Gregory Lane ()
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Gaurav Chiplunkar: University of Virginia
Erin Kelley: World Bank
Gregory Lane: University of Chicago

No 16840, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study how job-seekers share information about jobs within their social network, and its implications for firms. We randomly increase the amount of competition for a job and find that job-seekers are less likely to share information about the job with their high ability peers. This lowers the quality of applicants, hires, and performance on the job - suggesting that firms who disseminate job information through social networks may see lower quality applicants than expected for their most competitive positions. While randomly offering higher wages attracts better talent, it is not able to fully overcome these strategic disincentives in information sharing.

Keywords: job information; social networks; labor markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 M51 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-knm, nep-lab, nep-net and nep-ure
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