Worker Representatives

Julian Budde (), Thomas Dohmen, Simon Jäger and Simon Trenkle ()
Additional contact information
Julian Budde: IZA
Simon Trenkle: IZA and IAB

No 17152, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study the descriptive and substantive representation of workers through worker representatives, focusing on the selection of German works council representatives and their impact on worker outcomes. Becoming a professional representative leads to substantial wage gains for the elected, concentrated among blue-collar workers. Representatives are positively selected in terms of pre-election earnings and person fixed effects. They are more likely to have undergone vocational training, show greater interest in politics, and lean left politically compared to the employees they represent; blue-collar workers are close to proportionally represented among works councilors. Drawing on a retirement-IV strategy and event-study designs around council elections, we find that blue-collar representatives reduce involuntary separations, consistent with blue-collar workers placing stronger emphasis on job security.

Keywords: representation; works-councils; unions; blue-collar worker (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 J53 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 80 pages
Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Worker Representatives (2024)
Working Paper: Worker Representativeses (2024)
Working Paper: Worker Representatives (2024)
Working Paper: Worker Representatives (2024)
Working Paper: Worker Representatives (2024)
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