Competitive Search with Private Information: Can Price Signal Quality?

James Albrecht, Xiaoming Cai (), Pieter A. Gautier () and Susan Vroman
Additional contact information
Xiaoming Cai: Peking University
Pieter A. Gautier: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

No 17246, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper considers competitive search equilibrium in a market for a good whose quality differs across sellers. Each seller knows the quality of the good that he or she is offering for sale, but buyers cannot observe quality directly. We thus have a "market for lemons" with competitive search frictions. In contrast to Akerlof (1970), we prove the existence of a unique equilibrium, which is separating. Higher-quality sellers post higher prices, so price signals quality. The arrival rate of buyers is lower in submarkets with higher prices, but this is less costly for higher-quality sellers given their higher continuation values. For some parameter values, higher-quality sellers post the full-information price; for other values these sellers have to post a higher price to keep lower-quality sellers from mimicking them. In an extension, we show that if sellers compete with auctions, the reserve price can also act as a signal.

Keywords: competitive search; signaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-des, nep-lab, nep-mac, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Related works:
Working Paper: Competitive Search with Private Information: Can Price Signal Quality? (2024)
Working Paper: Competitive search with private information: Can price signal quality? (2024)
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