Competitive Peers: The Way to Higher Paying Jobs?

Claudio Schilter (), Samuel Lüthi () and Stefan Wolter
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Claudio Schilter: University of Bern

No 17289, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We merge experimental data on competitiveness of a large sample of students with their complete educational history for up to ten years after the initial assessment. Exploiting quasi-random class assignments, we find that having competitive peers as classmates makes students choose and secure positions in higher-paying occupations. These occupations are also more challenging and more popular. On the cost side, competitive peers do not lead to a lower probability of graduating from the subsequent job-specific education, but they significantly increase the probability of requiring extra time to do so.

Keywords: peer effects; competitiveness; occupational choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D91 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-exp, nep-hrm, nep-lma and nep-ure
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Related works:
Working Paper: Competitive Peers: The Way to Higher Paying Jobs? (2024)
Working Paper: Competitive Peers: The Way to Higher Paying Jobs? (2024)
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