Missing the Target: Does Increased Capacity of the Local Government Improve Beneficiary Selection?

Viola Asri (), Kumar Biswas (), Sebastian Fehrler (), Urs Fischbacher (), Katharina Michaelowa () and Atonu Rabbani ()
Additional contact information
Viola Asri: Chr. Michelsen Institute
Kumar Biswas: University of Chicago
Sebastian Fehrler: University of Bremen
Urs Fischbacher: University of Konstanz
Katharina Michaelowa: University of Zurich
Atonu Rabbani: University of Dhaka

No 17365, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: The implementation of social policies is often hampered by the fact that local decision-makers may be unwilling or unable to implement the policy as intended by the central government. In contrast to research that focuses on incentivizing and holding local decision makers accountable, we examine capacity constraints in the context of beneficiary selection. Using a large-scale randomized trial in Bangladesh, we find that training and data provision improved knowledge of selection criteria. However, evidence of better targeting was limited, except for easily observable indicators of vulnerability. Improvements in targeting were more pronounced in committees led by highly educated chairpersons.

Keywords: social policy; targeting; local governance; behavior; RCT; Bangladesh (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H55 H75 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2024-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp17365.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17365

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().