Facing Inflated Rules – Experimental Evidence from Threshold Public Goods Games

Christian Grund () and Philipp Monschau
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Christian Grund: RWTH Aachen University
Philipp Monschau: RWTH Aachen University

No 18075, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study the role of purpose-based rules for behavior and outcomes in a threshold public good game. Rules can be sufficient or even inflated in terms of proposing a fulfilling behavior. We conduct a lab experiment to describe the implications caused by the inflation of a rule. Our study shows that inflated rules are obeyed less. Yet, rule-following occurs also with inflated rules which leads to lower efficiency regarding exactly providing the threshold. A fair share option can help to coordinate efficiently. We complement our analysis by the investigation of the role of the implemented rules for the ex-post optimal behavior, i.e. evaluating the individual contribution depending on the individual payoff.

Keywords: thresholds; groups; cooperation; coordination; rule-following; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H41 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08
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