Employer Monopsony Power Does Not Reduce the Value of a Statistical Life

Robert J Cramer (), Thomas J. Kniesner () and W Viscusi
Additional contact information
Robert J Cramer: Vanderbilt University
Thomas J. Kniesner: Claremont Graduate University

No 18173, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Although wage rates are lower when employers have monopsony power, we find that the value of a statistical life (VSL) is not reduced when labor markets are more concentrated. Because the estimated VSL is the product of the wage and the wage-risk tradeoff rate, a greater tradeoff rate in highly concentrated U.S. labor markets produces a larger VSL. The general relationship we find is robust with respect to different labor market data. Our results provide the first evidence contradicting policy-related concerns that the VSL is lower in monopsonistic labor markets.

Keywords: monopsony; VSL; value of a statistical life; concentration; HHI (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J17 J42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp18173.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18173

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().