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All Eyes on the Nerd? The Unequal Distribution of Teachers’ Attention

Sofoklis Goulas (), Rigissa Megalokonomou () and Tommaso Sartori ()
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Sofoklis Goulas: Yale University
Rigissa Megalokonomou: Monash University
Tommaso Sartori: Monash University

No 18294, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Teachers play a central role in shaping how students benefit from peers, yet little is known about how classroom composition affects their attention-allocation decisions. We conduct a large-scale randomized experiment using realistic class- room vignettes to assess how teachers engage with students under varying scenarios and objectives. The presence of a high achiever reduces the likelihood that teachers engage with a low achiever by about 8%, with substantially larger effects when teachers prioritize task success, consistent with convenience-based decision-making. Using administrative data, we show that low achievers perform worse when quasi-randomly assigned to a classroom with an exceptional student.

Keywords: randomized controlled trial; attention allocation; teacher behavior; educational inequality; peer effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D91 I21 I28 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
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