Why Are More Redistributive Social Security Systems Smaller? A Median Voter Approach
Marko Koethenbuerger,
Panu Poutvaara and
Paola Profeta
No 1831, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
We suggest a political economy explanation for the stylized fact that intragenerationally more redistributive social security systems are smaller. We relate the stylized fact to an "efficiency-redistribution" trade-off to be resolved by political process. The inefficiency of social security financing is due to endogenous labor supply. Using data on eight European countries, we find that the stylized fact and a considerable degree of cross-country variation in contribution rates can be explained by the median voter model.
Keywords: public pensions; applied political economy; earnings-related and flat-rate benefits; labor supply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2005-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
Published - published in: Oxford Economic Papers, 2008, 60 (2), 275-292
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Journal Article: Why are more redistributive social security systems smaller? A median voter approach (2008) 
Working Paper: Why are more redistributive social security systems smaller? A median voter approach (2008)
Working Paper: Why are More Redistributive Social Security Systems Smaller? A Median Voter Approach (2005) 
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