Tournaments and Multiple Productive Inputs: The Case of Performance Enhancing Drugs

Kai Konrad

No 1844, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper I consider the desirability of drugs that enhance cognitive abilities in the context of tournaments that are used as optimal labor contracts as in Lazear and Rosen (1981). Such drugs reduce the number of voluntary participants in a tournament, but increase individual and total output. If the tournament is optimally designed, welfare is higher if drugs are available and used.

Keywords: labor market incentives; tournament; cognitive enhancement drugs; doping; entry in tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 L23 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2005-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-spo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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