Facts, Role Models, and Frontline Effort: Evidence from Garment Workers in Vietnam

Yuyu Chen (), Lukas Hensel () and Xinjue Yao ()
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Yuyu Chen: Peking University
Lukas Hensel: Peking University
Xinjue Yao: University of Hong Kong

No 19063, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: Complex and opaque pay systems can weaken the link between incentives and worker behavior. We conduct a field experiment with 1,749 sewing-machine operators in Vietnam, using cross-randomized social-media videos about pay incentives. The information increases worker effort, potentially because of increased occupational self-efficacy. However, information also shifts workers toward less difficult tasks, offsetting the effort effect and leaving total output and earnings unchanged. Adding a story of a successful worker backfired and offset the effort gain. This shows that information about incentive systems must account for the multidimensionality of behavior and perceived agency at work.

Keywords: information provision; role model; worker effort; self-efficacy; field experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D83 D91 J22 J24 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11
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