Options to Quit
Gerard Pfann ()
No 197, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
This paper develops a theoretical model of a worker’s decision problem under uncertainty about the optimal separation time, when holding a representative outside offer but facing fixed costs of quitting. Implications of the model’s closed form solution are consistent with the quit behavior of workers from a large Dutch company.
Keywords: voluntary turnover; Job mobility; fixed costs; timing; downsizing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in: Economics Letters, 2001, 70 (2), 59-265
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Journal Article: Options to quit (2001)
Working Paper: Options to Quit (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp197
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