Options to Quit

Gerard Pfann

No 197, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical model of a worker’s decision problem under uncertainty about the optimal separation time, when holding a representative outside offer but facing fixed costs of quitting. Implications of the model’s closed form solution are consistent with the quit behavior of workers from a large Dutch company.

Keywords: voluntary turnover; Job mobility; fixed costs; timing; downsizing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2000-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Economics Letters, 2001, 70 (2), 59-265

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Journal Article: Options to quit (2001)
Working Paper: Options to Quit (2000)
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