Screening Disability Insurance Applications

Philip de Jong (), Maarten Lindeboom () and Bas van der Klaauw
Additional contact information
Philip de Jong: University of Amsterdam

No 1981, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.

Keywords: sickness absenteeism; self-screening; policy evaluation; experiment; disability insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J28 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2006-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published - published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2011, 9(1), 106-129

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https://docs.iza.org/dp1981.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: SCREENING DISABILITY INSURANCE APPLICATIONS (2011)
Working Paper: Screening Disability Insurance Applications (2006)
Working Paper: Screening disability insurance applications (2006)
Working Paper: Screening Disability Insurance Applications (2006)
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