Pay and Productivity in a Corporatist Economy: Evidence from Austria

Scott Fuess and Meghan Millea ()
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Meghan Millea: Mississippi State University

No 244, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: Conventional theory predicts that productivity gains lead to hikes in real pay. Efficiency wage theory hypothesizes that pay increases can lead to productivity improvements. But would such results be observed in a corporatist economy with centralized bargaining? For the case of Austria, a corporatist archetype, this study uses an innovative technique developed by Geweke to disentangle the relationship between pay and productivity. There already has been empirical evidence that pay demands in corporatist economies are relatively modest. Moreover, it has been claimed that corporatist coordination enhances the efficiency of labor contracts, by providing a mechanism to adjust to aggregate shocks. Our findings uncover another efficiency benefit of corporatism. For laborers in manufacturing, we find that wage hikes result in productivity gains. Managers, then, are rewarded following improvements in productivity.

Keywords: efficiency wages; Labor Contracts; corporatism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C22 J30 J41 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2001-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp244

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