Bargaining at Divorce: The Allocation of Custody

Christine Atteneder () and Martin Halla
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Christine Atteneder: University of Linz

No 2544, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We model the bargaining process of parents over custody at the time of divorce. First we assume an institutional setting where only sole custody is available. In a second step we reform this institutional setting and introduce the possibility of joint custody. We show that some parents, who would not be able to find an agreement in a sole custody regime, can find an agreement after the joint custody reform. Accordingly, our empirical analysis shows that the introduction of joint custody enables more parents to divorce by mutual consent.

Keywords: (joint) custody; divorce; family law; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D1 J12 J13 K36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2007-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Bargaining at divorce: The allocation of custody (2007)
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