Economics at your fingertips  

Wage Persistence and Labour Market Institutions: An Analysis of Young European Workers

António Menezes (), Dario Sciulli () and José Vieira ()

No 2627, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of labour market institutions on wage persistence among young European workers at the beginning of their careers. We use ECHP data from 1995 to 2001 for 13 EU countries and estimate a three-level random intercept probit model that allows for unobserved heterogeneity both at the individual and country level. Overall, we find that labour market institutions explain wage persistence. In particular, we find that a high level of employment protection legislation and a high level of bargaining centralization increase wage persistence.

Keywords: labour market institutions; unobserved heterogeneity; wage persistence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 J31 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2007-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Published - published in: Applied Economics Letters, 2011, 18 (9), 823 - 828

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Wage persistence and labour market institutions: an analysis of young European workers (2011) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().

Page updated 2022-01-27
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2627