EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Brain Drain, Fiscal Competition, and Public Education Expenditure

Hartmut Egger (), Josef Falkinger and Volker Grossmann ()

No 2747, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper uses a two-country model with integrated markets for high-skilled labor to analyze the opportunities and incentives for national governments to provide higher education. Countries can differ in productivity, and education is financed through a wage tax, so that brain drain affects the tax base and has agglomeration effects. We study unilateral possibilities for triggering or avoiding brain drain and compare education policies and migration patterns in non-cooperative political equilibria with the consequences of bilateral cooperation between countries. We thereby demonstrate that bilateral coordination tends to increase public education expenditure compared to non-cooperation. At the same time, it aims at preventing migration. This is not necessarily desirable from the point of view of a social planner who takes account of the interests of migrants.

Keywords: locational competition; educational choice; public education policy; brain drain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 H52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-hrm, nep-mig and nep-pbe
Date: 2007-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in: Review of International Economics, 2012, 20 (1), 81-94

Downloads: (external link)
http://ftp.iza.org/dp2747.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Brain Drain, Fiscal Competition, and Public Education Expenditure (2012) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2747

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().

 
Page updated 2019-06-18
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2747