Income Transfers, Welfare and Family Decisions

Joaquin Andaluz, Miriam Marcén and José Alberto Molina

No 2804, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of different income transfers on individual welfare, in both marriage and divorce situations, and on family decisions. We assume three generations within the family. We develop a sequential game that, in a first stage, determines the optimum level of the transfer within a relationship of one-sided altruism. In the second stage, the level of welfare is deduced by way of a Nash bargaining solution. We show that inter-generational transfers may produce losses derived from the marriage. We have also found that the donor of an intergenerational transfer can behave in a compensatory way in an altruism model.

Keywords: income transfers; welfare; marriage; Nash-bargaining; family decisions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D10 D13 D64 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2007-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hap
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published - published as "The effects of inter-generational transfers on the marital surplus" in The Manchester School, 2017, 85 (3), 320-338

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp2804.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2804

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().