The Effect of Incentive Structure on Heuristic Decision Making: The Proportion Heuristic

Robert Oxoby

No 2857, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: When making judgments, individuals often utilize heuristics to interpret information. We report on a series of experiments designed to test the ways in which incentive mechanisms influence the use of a particular heuristic in decision-making. Specifically, we demonstrate how information regarding the number of available practice problems influences the behaviors of individuals preparing for an exam (the proportion heuristic). More importantly the extent to which this information influences behavior depends critically on the way in which performance incentives are structured. In particular, relative compensation schemes magnify the influence of this heuristic while joint compensation schemes dampen its influence. We discuss these results with respect to the literature on effective compensation.

Keywords: incentives; heuristics; performance judgments; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2007-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
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Published - published in: Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 2009, 39 (1), 120 - 133

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