The Effect of Sanctions on the Job Finding Rate: Evidence from Denmark

Michael Svarer

No 3015, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of sanctions of unemployment insurance benefits on the exit rate from unemployment for a sample of Danish unemployed. According to the findings are that even moderate sanctions have rather large effects. For both males and females the exit rate increases by more than 50% following imposition of a sanction. The paper exploits a rather large sample to elaborate on the basic findings. It is shown that harder sanctions have a larger effect, that the effect of sanctions wear out after around 3 months and that particular groups of unemployed are more responsive to sanctions than others. Finally, the analysis suggests that men react ex ante to the risk of being sanctioned in the sense that men who face higher sanction risk leave unemployment faster.

Keywords: unemployment hazard; sanctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C41 J6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2007-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-ias and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

Published - published as 'The Effect of Sanctions on Exit from Unemployment: Evidence from Denmark' in: Economica, 2011, 78 (312), 751 - 778

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp3015.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Effect of Sanctions on the Job Finding Rate: Evidence from Denmark (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3015

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().