Preferences, Intentions, and Expectations: A Large-Scale Experiment with a Representative Subject Pool

Charles Bellemare (), Sabine Kröger () and Arthur van Soest ()

No 3022, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We specify and estimate an econometric model which separately identifies distributional preferences and the effects of perceived intentions on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. We allow the effects of perceived intentions to depend, among other things, on the subjective probabilities responders attach to the possible offers. We estimate the model on a large representative sample from the Dutch population. We find that the relative importance of distributional preferences and perceived intentions depends significantly on the socioeconomic characteristics of responders. Strong inequity aversion to the other player’s disadvantage is found for lower educated and older respondents. Responders tend to punish unfavorable offers more if they expect that fair proposals will occur with higher probability.

Keywords: intentions; subjective expectations; inequity aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D63 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2007-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2011, 78 (3), 349-365

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Related works:
Working Paper: Preferences, Intentions, and Expectations: a Large-Scale Experiment with a Representative Subject Pool (2007)
Working Paper: Preferences, Intentions, and Expectations: A Large-Scale Experiment With a Representative Subject Pool (2007)
Working Paper: Preferences, Intentions, and Expectations: A Large-Scale Experiment With a Representative Subject Pool (2007)
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