Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores

Alberto Alesina, Andrea Ichino and Loukas Karabarbounis

No 3233, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Gender Based Taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey’s optimal criterion by taxing less the more elastic labor supply of (married) women. This holds when different elasticities between men and women are taken as exogenous and primitive. But in this paper we also explore differences in gender elasticities which emerge endogenously in a model in which spouses bargain over the allocation of home duties. GBT changes spouses’ implicit bargaining power and induces a more balanced allocation of house work and working opportunities between males and females. Because of decreasing returns to specialization in home and market work, social welfare improves by taxing conditional on gender. When income sharing within the family is substantial, both spouses may gain from GBT.

Keywords: family economics; economics of gender; optimal taxation; elasticity of labor supply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 H21 J16 J20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2007-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (62)

Published - published in: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2011, 3 (2), 1-40

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Related works:
Journal Article: Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores (2011)
Working Paper: Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores (2011)
Working Paper: Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores (2007)
Working Paper: Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores (2007)
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