The Effect of Intragroup Communication on Preference Shifts in Groups

Michael P. Brady () and Steven Wu ()
Additional contact information
Michael P. Brady: U.S. Department of Agriculture

No 3429, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We use a laboratory gift-exchange game to examine decisions made by groups under three different procedures that dictate how group members interact and reach decisions in comparison to individuals acting alone. We find that group decisions do deviate from those of individuals, but the direction and magnitude of gift exchange depend critically on the procedure. This suggests that no general statements can be made concerning the propensity of groups to exhibit reciprocal or other-regarding behavior relative to individuals. The rules governing how group members can express their preferences and expectations to other group members are critical for determining group outcomes.

Keywords: social preferences; group behavior; teams; decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published as "The aggregation of preferences in groups: Identity, responsibility, and polarization" in: Journal of Economic Psychology, 2010, 31(6), 950-963

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp3429.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3429

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().