Selfish and Prospective: Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting

Mikael Elinder, Henrik Jordahl and Panu Poutvaara

No 3763, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We present and test a theory of prospective and retrospective pocketbook voting. Focusing on two large reforms in Sweden, we establish a causal chain from policies to sizeable individual gains and losses and then to voting. The Social Democrats proposed budget cuts affecting parents with young children before the 1994 election, but made generous promises to the same group before the 1998 election. Since parents with older children were largely unaffected we use a difference-in-differences strategy for identification. We find clear evidence of prospective pocketbook voting. Voters respond to campaign promises but not to the later implementation of the reforms.

Keywords: economic voting; pocketbook voting; self-interest; prospective voting; retrospective voting; elections; child care (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 D72 H50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2008-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published - published as 'Promises, Policies and Pocketbook Voting' in: European Economic Review, 2015, 75, 177–194

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Related works:
Working Paper: Selfish and Prospective: Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting (2008)
Working Paper: Selfish and Prospective: Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting (2008)
Working Paper: Selfish and Prospective Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting (2008)
Working Paper: Selfish and Prospective. Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting (2008)
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