Volunteering and the State

Franz Hackl (), Martin Halla and Gerald Pruckner

No 4016, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper explores the capability of the state to affect the individual's decision to work for free. For this purpose we combine individual-level data from the European and World Values Survey with macroeconomic and political variables for OECD member countries. Empirically we identify three channels for crowding out of voluntary labor. Firstly, an increase in public social expenditure decreases the probability that the individual will volunteer (fiscal crowding out). Secondly, a political consensus between individuals and the government also induces volunteers to reduce their unsalaried activities (consensual crowding out). And finally, the more a government supports democratization, the lower is the individual's engagement (participatory crowding out). Religiosity and a more unequal income distribution in a country increase individuals’ willingness to volunteer.

Keywords: political consensus; voluntary labor supply; public social expenditure; private provision of public goods; volunteering; democratization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D64 H11 H31 H41 H44 I38 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published - revised version published in: Public Choice,2012, 151 (3-4), 465 - 495

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Related works:
Journal Article: Volunteering and the state (2012)
Working Paper: Volunteering and the State (2009)
Working Paper: Volunteering and the State (2009)
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