Pay for Politicians and Candidate Selection: An Empirical Analysis

Kaisa Kotakorpi () and Panu Poutvaara
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Kaisa Kotakorpi: University of Turku

No 4235, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In this paper, we estimate the effect of pay for politicians on who wants to be a politician. We take advantage of a considerable 35 percent salary increase of Finnish MPs in the year 2000, intended to make the pay for parliamentarians more competitive. A difference-indifferences analysis, using candidates in municipal elections as a control group, suggests that the higher salary had the intended effect among women, whether measured by education or occupational qualifications. We also examine cross-party differences.

Keywords: candidate selection; gender differences in politics; pay for politicians (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J3 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-pol
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Published - published in: Journal of Public Economics, 2011, 95 (7-8), 877 - 885

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https://docs.iza.org/dp4235.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Pay for politicians and candidate selection: An empirical analysis (2011)
Journal Article: Pay for politicians and candidate selection: An empirical analysis (2011)
Working Paper: Pay for politicians and candidate selection: An empirical analysis (2011)
Working Paper: Pay for Politicians and Candidate Selection: An Empirical Analysis (2010)
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