Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor Contracts

Pierre Picard and David Wildasin

No 4357, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Economic regions, such as urban agglomerations, face external demand and price shocks that produce income risk. Workers in large and diversified agglomerations may benefit from reduced wage volatility, while firms may outsource the production of intermediate goods and realize benefits from Chamberlinian externalities. Firms may also protect workers from wage risks through fixed wage contracts. This paper explores the relationships between firms' risks, workers' contracts, and the structure of production in cities.

Keywords: labor contracts; Chamberlinian externalities; labor market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J65 R12 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-geo, nep-lab and nep-ure
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Published - published in: Journal of Urban Economics, 2011, 70 (1), 47-60.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor Contracts (2009)
Working Paper: Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor Contracts (2009)
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