How Sensitive Are Retirement Decisions to Financial Incentives: A Stated Preference Analysis

Vo?ková, Hana () and Arthur van Soest ()
Additional contact information
Vo?ková, Hana: Tilburg University

No 4505, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study effects of financial incentives on the retirement age using stated preference data. Dutch survey respondents were given hypothetical retirement scenarios describing age(s) of (partial and full) retirement and replacement rate(s). A structural model is estimated in which utility is the discounted sum of within period utilities that depend on employment status and income. Parameters of the utility function vary with observed and unobserved characteristics. Simulations show that the income and substitution effects of pensions as a function of the retirement age are substantial and larger than according to studies using data on actual retirement decisions.

Keywords: pensions; flexible retirement; gradual retirement; stated choices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C81 J22 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-dcm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp4505.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: HOW SENSITIVE ARE RETIREMENT DECISIONS TO FINANCIAL INCENTIVES? A STATED PREFERENCE ANALYSIS (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4505

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().