Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe

Daniel Hamermesh and Gerard Pfann

No 4610, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We develop a theory of the market for individual reputation, an indicator of regard by one’s peers and others. The central questions are: 1) Does the quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of their quality? and 2) Assuming that overall quality matters for reputation, does the quality of an individual’s most important exposure have an extra effect on reputation? Using evidence for academic economists, we find that, conditional on its impact, the quantity of output has no or even a negative effect on each of a number of proxies for reputation, and very little evidence that a scholar's most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation. Quality ranking matters more than absolute quality. Data on mobility and salaries show, on the contrary, substantial positive effects of quantity, independent of quality. We test various explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary.

Keywords: salary determination; quality/quantity trade-off; mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-ltv and nep-sog
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published - published as 'Reputation and Earnings: The Roles of Quality and Quantity in Academe' in: Economic Inquiry, 2012, 50 (1), 1 - 16

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp4610.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe (2009)
Working Paper: Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4610

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().