What's the Use of Marriage?

Alessandro Cigno

No 4635, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the choice of game conditional on marriage. We find that, in the absence of social stigma or legal discrimination against unmarried couples, a couple will marry only if marriage serves as a commitment device which facilitates cooperation.

Keywords: fertility; matrimonial property; alimony; divorce; marriage; cohabitation; gender; division of labour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 J12 J13 J16 J24 K30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2009-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published - published as 'Marriage as a commitment device' in: Review of Economics of the Household, 2012, 10 (2), 171-192

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