Trade Union Membership and Dismissals

Laszlo Goerke and Markus Pannenberg

No 5222, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In Germany, there is no trade union membership wage premium, while the membership fee amounts to 1% of the gross wage. Therefore, prima facie, there are strong incentives to free-ride on the benefits of trade unionism. We establish empirical evidence for a private gain from trade union membership which has hitherto not been documented: in West Germany, union members are less likely to lose their jobs than non-members. In particular, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel we can show that roughly 50% of the observed raw differential in individual dismissal rates can be explained by the estimated average partial effect of union membership.

Keywords: dismissal; free-riding; trade union membership; survey data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 H41 J51 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-int and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - revised version published in: Labour Economics, 2011, 18 (6), 810-821

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Related works:
Journal Article: Trade union membership and dismissals (2011)
Working Paper: Trade Union Membership and Dismissals (2010)
Working Paper: Trade Union Membership and Dismissals (2010)
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