The Locking-in Effect of Subsidized Jobs

Jan van Ours

No 527, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: Recent evaluations of active labor market policies are not very optimistic about their effectiveness to bring unemployed back to work. An important reason is that unemployed get locked-in, that is they reduce their effort to find a regular job. This paper uses an administrative dataset from the Slovak Republic on durations of individual unemployment spells. The focus of the analysis is temporary subsidized jobs. By exploiting the variation in the duration of these jobs it is possible to investigate whether or not the locking-in effect is important. It turns out that it is.

Keywords: unemployment; active labor market policy; duration models; subsidized jobs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C41 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2002-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: Journal of Comparative Economics, 2004, 32 (1), 37-55

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp527.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The locking-in effect of subsidized jobs (2004)
Working Paper: The locking-in effect of subsidized jobs (2004)
Working Paper: The Locking-in Effect of Subsidized Jobs (2002)
Working Paper: The Locking-In Effect of Subsidized Jobs (2002)
Working Paper: The Locking-In Effect of Subsidized Jobs (2002)
Working Paper: The Locking-in Effect of Subsidized Jobs (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp527

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark Fallak ().