The Case for Presenteeism

Simen Markussen, Arnstein Mykletun () and Knut Røed ()
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Arnstein Mykletun: Norwegian Institute of Public Health

No 5343, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Can activation requirements control moral hazard problems in public sickness absence insurance and accelerate recovery? Based on empirical analysis of Norwegian data, we show that it can. Activation requirements not only bring down benefit claims, they also reduce the likelihood that long-term sickness absence leads to inactivity. Our findings show that absentees who are issued graded (partial) absence certificates by their physician have shorter absences and higher subsequent employment rates than they would have had on regular sick leave. We conclude that the activation strategies that in recent years have permeated European and US welfare policy may fruitfully be carried over to sick leave insurance.

Keywords: workfare; activation; disability; sick leave (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C26 I18 I38 J48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published - revised version published as 'The Case for Presenteeism - Evidence from Norway's Sickness Insurance Program' in: Journal of Public Economics, 2012, 96 (11-12), 959-972

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