In-Work Benefits and Unemployment
Mirco Tonin and
Ann-Sofie Kolm
No 5473, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
In-work benefits are becoming an increasingly relevant labour market policy, gradually expanding in scope and geographical coverage. This paper investigates the equilibrium impact of in-work benefits and contrasts it with the traditional partial equilibrium analysis. We find under which conditions accounting for equilibrium wage adjustments amplifies the impact of in-work benefits on search intensity, participation, employment, and unemployment, compared to a framework in which wages are fixed. We also account for the financing of these benefits and determine the level of benefits necessary to achieve efficiency in a labour market characterized by search externalities.
Keywords: search; in-work benefits; labour force participation; wage adjustment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 J21 J38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2011-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)
Published - published in: International Tax and Public Finance, 2011, 18 (1), 74-92
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Journal Article: In-work benefits and unemployment (2011) 
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