How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country

Alessandro Cigno

No 5663, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need and merit based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.

Keywords: optimal taxation; moral hazard; uncertainty; education; child labour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H21 H31 I28 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2011-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dev and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: World Bank Economic Review, 2012, 26 (1), 61-67

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Journal Article: How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country (2012)
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