Allocating Awards Across Noncomparable Categories

Lonnie Magee () and Michael Veall

No 617, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Suppose an agency awards a fixed number of prizes to applicants in different categories such that the applicant-to-winner ratio is constant by category. It is demonstrated in a simple theoretical model that the number of awards in a category will typically be positively related to the degree of applicant uncertainty. The theoretical findings are related to awards data from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship competition.

Keywords: applicant behavior; fellowships; scholarships; selection committee behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2002-10
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Working Paper: Allocating Awards Across Noncomparable Categories (2002)
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