A Model of NGO Regulation with an Application to Uganda

Ronelle Burger (), Indraneel Dasgupta () and Trudy Owens

No 6221, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We develop a model of regulation of service-delivery NGOs, where future grants are conditional on prior spending of some minimal proportion of current revenue on direct project-related expenses. Such regulation induces some NGOs to increase current project spending, but imposes wasteful costs of compliance verification on all NGOs. Under a large class of parametric configurations, we find that regulation increases total discounted project expenditure over a regime of no regulation, when verification costs constitute no more than 15% of initial revenue. We characterize the optimal regulatory policy under these configurations. We apply our analysis to a large sample of NGOs from Uganda, and find regulation to be beneficial in that context.

Keywords: developing countries; regulation of non-governmental organizations; Uganda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G18 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2015, 64 (1), 71-111

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp6221.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Model of NGO Regulation with an Application to Uganda (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6221

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().