Transnational Trafficking, Law Enforcement and Victim Protection: A Middleman Trafficker's Perspective

Randall Akee, Arjun Bedi, Arnab Basu and Nancy Chau

No 6226, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We explore three hitherto poorly understood characteristics of the human trafficking market – the cross-border ease of mobility of traffickers, the relative bargaining strength of traffickers and final buyers, and the elasticity of buyers' demand. In a model of two-way bargaining, the exact configuration of these characteristics is shown to determine whether domestic and foreign crackdowns on illicit employment mutually reinforce or counteract one another in efforts to stem the tide of trafficking. Estimation results from a gravity model of trafficking present evidence consistent with the mutual reinforcement view, indicating considerable ease of mobility, partial bargaining power, and inelastic demand.

Keywords: victim protection; two-way Nash bargaining; human trafficking; law enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 O15 R23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue, nep-law and nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

Published - revised version published in: Journal of Law and Economics, 2014, 57 (2), 349-386

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Journal Article: Transnational Trafficking, Law Enforcement, and Victim Protection: A Middleman Trafficker's Perspective (2014)
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