Selective Hiring and Welfare Analysis in Labor Market Models

Christian Merkl and Thijs van Rens

No 6294, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standard search models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired. We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphic to a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selective hiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costs of unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequally across workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfare is lower if hiring is selective.

Keywords: labor market models; welfare; optimal unemployment insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-lab and nep-mac
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published - revised version published in: Labour Economics, 2019, 57, 117-130

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp6294.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models (2019)
Working Paper: Selective Hiring and Welfare Analysis in Labor Market Models (2018)
Working Paper: Selective Hiring and Welfare Analysis in Labor Market Models (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6294

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().