Media Slant Against Foreign Owners: Downsizing
Guido Friebel () and
Matthias Heinz ()
Additional contact information
Matthias Heinz: University of Cologne
No 6859, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
We establish the existence of strong media slant against foreign owners. Using a unique data set from nation-wide distributed quality newspapers in Germany, we find that a foreign firm that downsizes in Germany receives almost twice as much attention than a domestic firm. This quantitative slant is accompanied by qualitative slant; newspapers report in a more negative way about downsizing foreign than domestic firms. The slant is present in all quality newspapers, but it increases from right to left in the political spectrum. This is consistent with theory papers arguing that slant is an equilibrium phenomenon. The slant we document is a clean measure for economic xenophobia; however, not geared against migrants, but against foreign owners. The slant can be a substantial obstacle to FDI, as illustrated by case studies. Our results are likely to be a lower bound estimate, because Germans are rather globalization-friendly and we are looking at quality papers, not tabloids.
Keywords: multi-national enterprises; economic xenophobia; globalization; media economics; foreign direct investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L10 L33 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2012-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Published - published in: Journal of Public Economics, 2014, 120 , 97-106
Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp6859.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Media slant against foreign owners: Downsizing (2014) 
Working Paper: Media slant against foreign owners: Downsizing (2012) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6859
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().