Central School Exit Exams and Labor-Market Outcomes

Marc Piopiunik (), Guido Schwerdt and Ludger Woessmann

No 6889, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Many countries use centralized exit exams as a governance devise of the school system. While abundant evidence suggests positive effects of central exams on achievement tests, previous research on university-bound students shows no effects on subsequent earnings. We suggest that labor-market effects may be more imminent for students leaving school directly for the labor market and, on rigid labor markets, for unemployment. Exploiting variation in exit-exam systems across German states, we find that central exams are indeed associated with higher earnings for students from school types directly bound for the labor market, as well as with lower unemployment.

Keywords: unemployment; earnings; central exit exams; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 J24 J31 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma and nep-ure
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Published - published in: European Journal of Political Economy, 2013, 31, 93-108

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Related works:
Journal Article: Central school exit exams and labor-market outcomes (2013)
Working Paper: Central school exit exams and labor-market outcomes (2013)
Working Paper: Central School Exit Exams and Labor-Market Outcomes (2012)
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