Employer's Information and Promotion-Seeking Activities

Gil Epstein

No 7023, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: This paper presents a model in which promotion of employees within the internal firm hierarchy is determined by the individuals' allocation of time between promotion/rent-seeking and productive activity. We consider the effect of an increase in the employer's knowledge (information) regarding the employees' productivity levels on the total time spent by the workers in non-productive promotion-seeking activities.

Keywords: promotion-seeking activities; contest; knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 D72 J2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2012-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hrm and nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published - published in: Economics and Business Letters, 2012, 1(4), 21-32

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