Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

James Albrecht, Pieter Gautier and Susan Vroman

No 719, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.

Keywords: job search; directed search; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2003-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - published in: Review of Economic Studies, 2006, 73 (4), 869-891

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Related works:
Journal Article: Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications (2006)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications (2004)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications (2004)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Application (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp719

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