Gender Differences in Cooperation: Experimental Evidence on High School Students

José Alberto Molina, José Ignacio Gimenez-Nadal (), José A. Cuesta (), Carlos Garcia-Lazaro (), Yamir Moreno () and Angel Sanchez ()
Additional contact information
José Ignacio Gimenez-Nadal: University of Zaragoza
José A. Cuesta: University of Zaragoza
Carlos Garcia-Lazaro: University of Zaragoza
Yamir Moreno: University of Zaragoza
Angel Sanchez: University of Zaragoza
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jose Ignacio Gimenez-Nadal ()

No 7421, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: Charles Darwin (1874) stated that "women are less selfish but men are more competitive". Very recent papers (Eckel & Grossman, 1998, 2001 or Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001, among others) have shown the relevance of gender in altruism in both ultimatum and dictator games. In this paper we analyze the role of gender in repeated Prisoners' Dilemma played by Spanish high-school students in both a square lattice and a heterogeneous network. We find that female students have a higher probability of cooperation than male students.

Keywords: gender differences; cooperation; high school students; prisoners' dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C93 D03 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cse, nep-dem, nep-edu, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Published - published in: PLoS ONE, 2013, 8(12): e83700.

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Journal Article: Gender Differences in Cooperation: Experimental Evidence on High School Students (2013)
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